Tag Archives: sustainable competitive advantage

Nvidia: a company in a cyclical industry, with a competitive advantage

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June 15, 2024. A quantitative feature that I have used to help identify companies with a durable competitive advantage, is the relatively consistent growth of revenue over many years.  I reason that the persistent climb in revenue is related to the indispensable nature of company products or services, with related durable competitive advantage, and to a large, persistent demand for them, commonly referred to as a “long runway” of persistent total addressable market.  I had avoided cyclical companies, whose stock price rises or falls with the demand cycle.  In order to obtain a superior return, you need to buy at the bottom of the cycle. But in practice it is difficult to know when the company’s fortunes will recover, or when the stock price will stop falling.

Visa and Microsoft are examples of companies with strong competitive advantages and products that are indispensable for large and growing markets.  Since its IPO in 2008, Visa’s  sole decrease in annual revenue occurred in 2020. Government policies enacted during the history making Covid 19 pandemic abruptly curtailed international travel. The fall in purchases by persons travelling internationally slowed cross border payment volumes.  Impressively, Visa total annual revenue did not decrease during the Great recession of 2008-2009.

Microsoft has had minor if any decrease in revenue except in 2009 due to great recession.  In that economic crisis, primarily revenue from Windows software sold to corporations (the Client business segment) decreased, and price cuts for gaming software and hardware slowed gaming revenue.  By 2010 both revenue and earnings exceeded the 2008 levels.  Of note, revenue from the Business Division, including the Office suite of productivity software, was essentially flat. This product was more economically resilient because it has powerful switching costs and generates revenue largely through multiyear contracts.

Nvidia was brought to my attention by the rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in public awareness.  Review of its Annual Reports , shows that Nvidia has in the past had prolonged decreases in revenue and earnings, related to adverse macroeconomic conditions. For instance, in 2009 revenue decreased relative to 2008, and did not recover until 2013. Diluted Earnings per Share decreased as well in 2009, showing a loss in 2009 and 2010, and not recovering the level of 2008 until 2017.  In previous periods of its history, rising costs caused earnings to show multiple years of losses or declines without a loss of gross revenue.

Revenue and earnings fell during the Great Recession because Nvidia at that time, derived most of its revenue from products for the PC market. In FY 2009, desktop GPU product sales decreased 29% year over year.  Moreover, cyclical decline can have prolonged effects. PC makers build inventory during periods of anticipated growth. They are left with excess inventory in the event this growth fails.  They can then delay additional purchases of the GPU inputs to PC manufacture, until end customer demand has resumed.

The datacenter GPU business segment, which now contributes the lion’s share of Nvidia revenue, did not yet exist in that era.

And yet, during the period of the Great Recession of 2009-2009, the research engineers at Nvidia were laying the foundation for its history making advances and competitive advantage of the next decade and more.

During 2008 as the global financial crisis accelerated, Nvidia “announced a workforce reduction to allow for continued investment in strategic growth areas… we eliminated … about 6.5% of our global workforce. … expenses associated with the workforce reduction, totaled $8.0 million. We anticipate that the expected decrease in operating expenses from this action will be offset by continued investment in strategic growth areas. ” (Nvidia 10K FY 2009) (Nvidia Fiscal Year ends in January of that year, so it reports on business activity occurring chiefly in the previous calendar year). 

Indeed, R&D expenditures continued to climb during this period.  In fiscal years 2008, 2009, 2010, R&D expenses continued to climb, making up 17%, 25% and 27.3% of revenue for the respective years. (Nvidia 10K FY 2010, p36).

Nvidia GPU chips were originally designed for use in gaming and graphics software applications and by the mid-1990s Nvidia had come to dominate that market. The company IPO’d in 1999. In 2006 Nvidia conceived CUDA, a software platform that enables software to employ the parallel processing and accelerated computing of the GPU, for diverse applications other than solely graphics.  It supports a range of languages and a comprehensive armamentarium of tools allowing it to be used for a wide range of applications. CUDA builds competitive advantage in several ways. The CUDA software platform enables engineers to use accelerated computing driven by Nvidia GPU chips, for a wide variety of other useful and novel applications. This expands the addressable market of use cases for the GPU. Nvidia has fostered an ecosystem of software centered around diverse applications of CUDA, collaborating with myriad companies in diverse industries, from healthcare to pharmacy to automotive, to nurture vertical stacks of software supported by the CUDA platform. Approximately 5 million developers in that ecosystem create a network effect competitive advantage for other GPU manufacturers such as AMD. CUDA is compatible only with Nvidia chips. While it is optimized for upcoming, ever more potent chips, the software ensures backwards compatibility, so developers and end users can often update application software with their current hardware.  There is a strong switching cost competitive advantage versus other chip makers.

Nvidia is one of the rare companies that has consistently done the massive, risky work, anticipating emerging market segments, to  persistently adapt its competitive advantage to continue to dominate the market as it evolves.  During these decades, beginning well before the advent of real AI in 2012, and continuing today, the cultivation of the CUDA centered ecosystem, along with consistent hardware innovation including strategic acquisitions, enabled Nvidia to come to dominate the market  for datacenter GPUs and related high performance computing equipment which is required for AI.

Some general and striking realities about Nvidia’s current competitive position are fairly clear.  There is high demand for AI and accelerated computing capability, and it is not a transient fad.  The use cases are becoming permanent fixtures in the evolving economy. For example, AI is raising productivity of knowledge workers, and widening accessibility to computing applications by making them easier for non-specialists to use.  Accelerated computing makes attainable tasks previously too large to take on. For example, it enables health systems to harness their unstructured clinical or administrative data to yield insights regarding care provision or costs. Virtual digital twin factories can be designed and tested before building the actual plant, avoiding costs of trial and error.

It is clear that the accelerated computing that makes AI possible, largely requires Nvidia products. Specifically, these are the datacenter computer chips needed for accelerated computing, and the technology and software tools needed for the datacenter to efficiently produce (train) and work (inference) with AI models. 

Based on company communications to investors, demand is predicted to persistently outstrips supply.  In view of innumerable essential use cases, the runway and total addressable market is massive.  Nvidia commands at least 80% market share. Most likely revenue and income of the company will climb for some time.

With cyclical companies, there is the concern about avoiding stock purchase at the peak of the cycle. Nvidia stock fell in the macroeconomic perturbations of 2022, among predictions of recession and rising interest rates.  The PE in the quarter ending October 30, 2022 was about 60. It was 50 at the end of the quarter ending in April 2024.  Meanwhile, revenue had climbed more than 4 times, and earnings had grown 20X. 

Therefore it seemed, especially in view of the expectation for continued revenue growth, the stock was not overvalued.  I decided to reallocate some funds from United Health Group (UNH) to Nvidia.  Which I did on February 29th, at a purchase price of $793.16 with 5.4% of my portfolio in Nvidia at the close. The stock has since split 10 to 1.  At some time, it may be that demand for Nvidia data center products will decline. That is not happening soon.  At some point, Nvidia may become involved in a financial mania related to AI. That point has not yet arrived. Should it do so at some point in the future, I might reallocate some funds back to a non-cyclical company, such as United Health Group.

Mercado Libre Adapted to Market Challenges, with Fintech Revenue gradually outpacing Ecommerce. Concluding Evaluation.

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May 16, 2024.

Mercado Libre generates two revenue streams: Commerce Revenue and Fintech Revenue.

Commerce Revenue

A. Revenue related to Services, including fees for merchandise sold, shipping, ads, classifieds, and other services.

B. Revenue from Product sales fees, from first party Mercado Libre product sales and related shipping.

Fintech Revenue

a. commissions for transactions off Mercado Libre ecommerce platform, including digital payments, installment payments, asset trading, credit and debit cards, insurance,

b. interest on loans to consumers and sellers, and on Mercado Pago credit cards

c. Fintech Product Sales revenue from sales of MPOS devices.

Prior to 2020, Revenue was reported differently. Off-Marketplace Revenue corresponded essentially to Mercado Pago Fintech revenue plus shipping, and Ad sales.  On-Marketplace Revenue corresponded essentially to Commerce Revenue. If we can for argument’s sake accept equivalence of the historical Off-Marketplace Rev and modern Fintech Rev, and historical On-Marketplace Rev and modern Commerce Rev, then….

Business revenue has grown remarkably over time.  In 2013, Marketplace Revenue was $331.3 million. By 2023 Commerce Revenue had increased by 24.7 times  to $8.201 billion, a CAGR of 37.84%.   In 2013, Off-Marketplace Rev was $141.3 million.  By 2023, Fintech Revenue had grown by 44.4 times to $6.272 billion, a CAGR of 46.13%.

Fintech Revenue has grown at a faster rate than Commerce Revenue.  In 2013,  Off-Marketplace Revenue was 42.6% of the Marketplace Revenue. By 2023, Fintech Revenue was 76.5% of $8201 Commerce Revenue.  

Fintech Revenue growth outpaces Mercado Libre marketplace commerce revenue, likely because it is derived from a wider population of users, drawing from the wider market of financial services users, not just Mercado Libre marketplace ecommerce customers.  And yet, as previously described, robust ecommerce marketplace growth powered the expansion of Mercado Pago digital payments and fintech products. 

Concluding Evaluation

While revenue has grown consistently at a high rate, diluted EPS has grown with a bumpier course.  With a decrease in 2017, and annual earnings did not exceed the previous level of 2016, until 2022.  Over the decade, annual diluted EPS grew from 1.63 in 2014, increasing 12 times to 19.46 in 2023.

Between 2014 and 2023, top line revenue has grown at an average annual rate of increase of 42.4%. GROSS margin was 71.4% in 2014, fluctuated slightly while trending down over time, ending at 49.8% in 2023.  Outstanding for an ecommerce business. 

The more uneven progression in earnings can be traced to recurrent increases in expenses which are required to build out the business. Periodically, increases in operating expenses are generated by increases in shipping costs, marketing expenses, increased cost of goods sold related to increased sales of MPOS devices, and increasing salaries. Note that total employees grew 22.4 times, from 2,599 in 2014 to 58,313 in 2023.

As earnings grow unevenly, the ROIC is correspondingly of uneven growth.  (Remember that Return on Invested Capital has earnings in the numerator, in the form of Net Operating Profit after tax).  ROIC recovers as earnings do, in years following periods of increased operating expenses. One of the issues with Mercado Libre,  small cap company, growing rapidly in an “emerging market”, is the issue of requiring large increases in operating expenses in order to build out the business, and the lumpiness of earnings this causes. 

We can consider the uneven earnings history in the context of the demonstrated history of the company’s ability to build out the business, in spite of challenges, and successfully persist in growing revenues with a fairly consistent gross margin.  It is this history that allows us to have faith in an investment in this company. Increased operating costs were necessitated by the need to address challenges in the market: the need to create fintech services including MPOS capability and credit cards, the need to establish efficient logistics and shipping network, the need to market the company in the immature ecommerce market.  And these various novel branches of Mercado Libre reinforce the competitive advantages.  There, the historically recurrent increases in operating costs are demonstrably part of the company leadership efforts to adapt to the demands of the market in such a way that enhances the competitive ability of the various capabilities of the company. Sounds like our type of investment.

The gross margin is quite satisfactory.  This is important because this means the market opportunity is supports the business. Demand for this differentiated product and services enables pricing which supports the operating expenses needed to build out the business.

Balance sheet is adequate, showing that MELI has cash flow adequate to fund the capital expenditure required to build the company.  Debt/equity a bit higher than normal for my portfolio at 1.56 but interest coverage is satisfactory at more than 6. 

Free cash flow is very consistent, and Free Cash Flow Margin currently over 30%, confirming the ability to meet demands of Capex for the growing company.

Regarding valuation, the Free Cash Flow to Enterprise Value ratio is 15.8, which incredibly enough, is lower than it has been for the past 10 years.

Enough said for this brave little company.

Context of Competitive Advantage in the Health Care Insurance System.

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Feb 15, 2024. In early 2023, I became aware that United Health Group (UNH) was likely to possess a durable competitive advantage, since it had evolved over about 40 years to become a market dominating company, with an impressive total stockholder return. In order to discover the basis for this competitive advantage, I searched in vain for a book written by or about UNH founders or the company history. I did find a book about the US Healthcare insurance system history: Ensuring America’s Health: the Public Creation of the Corporate Health System. Christy Ford Chapin, published 2017. The following historical outline of the US health insurance system takes liberally from this interesting book.

From the inception of the income tax in 1913, fringe benefits including employee health insurance, were made tax deductible. Over time, public demand grew for comprehensive health insurance.  At the time of price controls during the war time economic policies of FDR, employers offered the tax-deductible employee health insurance fringe benefit to augment compensation and attract workers. The employer tax deduction for employee health insurance was more specifically codified in the Internal Revenue Act of 1954.

In insurance markets other than health insurance, the insured outcome is something that all parties to the insurance contract have an incentive to avoid.  A driver tries to avoid car damage, a home owner avoids burning his house down; the insurer certainly shares the sentiment. As premiums exceed claims most of the time, the company can accumulate a “float” of funds to be invested in order to earn additional income and build the financial resources to fund future claims. The size of the financial reserves thus accumulated, is the basis for the insurer’s promised ability to back claims successfully.

In contrast, in the health insurance market, the customer finds it desirable to make claims for service, a sentiment shared by the provider, and there are no clear  definitions as to what services are legitimately necessary for health. This means that health insurance is unprofitable in the sense that claims paid will tend to approach premium revenue, leaving no room for accumulation of float.  This means that it is a peculiar property of the US health insurance market, that the insurance company must be an important arbiter of the reimbursement rate for health care services.   Because in order to be profitable, the insurance company must devote systematic attention to controlling medical costs, where neither customer nor service provider have an incentive to do so.

Because of the poor economics of health insurance, early (following the Great Depression era) insurance policies covered a limited range of essentially catastrophic coverage.  In the 1940s employers began to offer naturally desirable more comprehensive health insurance partly to stymie labor unions’ influence.  As private insurance spread rapidly to become a popular benefit, unions demanded comprehensive coverage for their members as a counter for moderated wage increase. Physicians’ groups encouraged private insurance, while insisting on fee for service, and fended off insurer influence over reimbursement or choice of care. Physicians feared insurer restrictions on price and provider independence, which they considered to be a gateway to government sponsored coverage and associated control of reimbursement and practice. Private insurance companies, while unsettled about low margins, had similar fears regarding the development of government insurance, therefore tended to supply demand for progressively more comprehensive policies.  Their business grew rapidly.  Health care insurance was paid for by a third party, namely the employer, union or government. Regarding government payment, at this point in history, it was the growing Federal Employees Health Benefits Program which paid for and in effect subsidized private insurance for federal employees.  With prices determined by providers and ancillary healthcare service or equipment providers, who could be confident their costs would be covered, consumers were not restrained by prices, and healthcare price inflation exceeded that in the rest of the economy.

In the absence of other restraint on prices, private insurers gradually began to take a role in determining reimbursement. They were aided over time and experience by the evolution of actuarial data needed to do this effectively. As health insurance became more comprehensive, the many claims to be covered, involved innumerable conditions and treatments.  Over time, the complex data sets needed to make sense of claims administration were developed, at times including data sharing among different companies. This developed expertise in controlling reimbursement costs.

Healthcare inflation was a public policy issue which led to the formation of Medicare and Medicaid, the feared government sponsored plans, after at least a decade of discussion and negotiation. By that time the private health insurers had established a business infrastructure to address billing and payments.  In the political conflict between proponents leaning toward a government single payer system and those for private insurance, the use of the private insurance company model to administer the government sponsored systems, subject to government regulation and funding, was appealing as a viable compromise.

The creation of fully government funded health insurance, administered as it was by private insurers, who would thereby profit, meant that the private insurer model was further embedded in the structure of the US health care.  As price inflation did not abate, the insurance companies gradually increased their control over reimbursement, leading to DRGs, formation of HMOs, PPOs, and the current system, of which value based care is the latest attempt to maximize value per cost, while optimizing outcome as a value to the customer.

In summary: private health insurers play an indispensable role as mediator, or market maker, in the US health system.  They insure comprehensive health insurance, which most of the population regards as indispensable.  This is paid for at least as a strongly established expectation, if not legal entitlement, by employers and, ultimately, state and federal government. Because of the natural incentive to consume healthcare, in the peculiar economics of healthcare insurance policies, claims made tend to chase the level of premiums revenue, and gross margins are correspondingly attenuated.  But because of inexorably expanding demand, and reliable payment for insurance, health insurer revenues will tend to continue rising.  A company which has a market dominating position in this ecosystem, has access to total addressable market which will likely grow for the foreseeable future.  Market growth is driven by population growth, especially of the aged; increase in price and frequency of utilization; increase in government funding, among other factors.

The question remains, how can a company establish a market dominating position in this system? It would need to widen the gap between claims expenses and premiums revenue; that is, minimizing the medical loss ratio (MLR), funds paid for medical costs of members, divided by premiums revenue.  By economies of scale, in which an insurer accesses a relatively larger population of customers (potential patients) as members, it could demand relatively lower reimbursement prices from healthcare providers.  Meanwhile, access to a large number of providers attracts contracts from large corporate employers and large numbers of individuals, government entities or other payors. Moreover, it can build access to a diversified network of healthcare facilities that build on mutual synergies, to encourage lower prices as well as attract business from payors.  For instance, association with a large number of rehabilitation medicine providers could lead them to accept a lower reimbursement bid, if the insurer is also associated with a correspondingly large number of referring orthopedists. 

Other than minimizing the MLR relative to premiums revenue, the health insurer could create additional revenue streams by selling other services, derived from its experience in insuring, that raise productivity and lower costs for its customers as well as providers. For example, healthcare billing software, clinical pathway analytics, pharmacy services. 

Finally, the insurer could build or acquire healthcare providers that are incentivized to reduce cost relative to value through management guidelines developed by the previous insurance experience.

In a subsequent article, I will outline how United Healthcare uses these strategies to maintain a consistent competitive advantage relative to other insurers.

Amateurinvestor beats S&P by 20 percentage points in 2019

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May 24, 2020.  For 2019, Amateurinvestor portfolio performance, average annualized return:

1 year: 51.6%

3 year: 33%

5 year: 25%

10 year: 22.3%

For comparison, the performance of the Vanguard 500 Index Fund Admiral (VFIAX), as proxy for the S&P 500 index, annualized return before taxes:

1 year: 31.46%

3 year: 15.23%

5 year 11.66%

10 year 13.52%

As of 12-31-2019, my holdings were, in the following proportions:

Microsoft (MSFT): 50.7%

Visa (V): 30.7%

Adobe (ADBE) 18.26%

Cash: 0.27%

How was this stellar return achieved?  over time, i have experimented in investing a small amount in other companies in an attempt to diversify in order to reduce risk. Over time, i have realized that there is no rational reason to divert funds away from the very few companies companies which provide the strongest durable competitive advantage, and have the research and development and business expertise and experience to profitably extend their competitive advantage to the evolving market.

my companies all provide services which are central and indispensable in the modern evolving and expanding digital economy.

VISA Q1 2017 Earnings, harvesting market growth, ploughing and sowing for the future

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February 4, 2017.  VISA Q1 2017 (2-2-2017) earnings call was led by Alfred Kelly Jr., who became CEO, replacing Charlie Scharf on 12-1-2016.  Al Kelly graduated from Catholic, Christian Brothers affiliated Iona College, in Westchester, NY, with undergraduate and MBA degrees. He worked in the Reagan White House as manager of information systems (using DOS, or Windows 2.0?) from 1985 to 1987, then held a range of important roles at American Express for the next 23 years.  He has been on the VISA Board of Directors since 2014 and therefore played a role in approving the current strategy. 

In the earnings call, Kelly noted that VISA strategy will remain as is, in a seamless transition with the previous CEO. He noted VISA has a talented leadership team; strong relationships with issuers clients, acquirer clients and merchant clients. It is important to learn about and address their business needs while reducing friction in and enabling digital payments. VISA is in an industry with strong growth. In developing markets, middle classes and governments are demanding payment digitization. In developed markets, ecommerce and mobile payments are displacing checks and cash. VISA is a leader in payments technology and constantly supports innovation in ecommerce and novel forms of payment digitization.

I will address the overall strategy of VISA, which describes how VISA fills a key criterion of an Eternal Company investment: the ability to extend its competitive advance into evolving new markets, in a separate post.

Following is a summary of Q1 2017 financial results.  Rev and EPS exceeded expectations as accelerating business more than offset exchange rate shifts.  GAAP Q1 rev up 25%, EPS 7%. Adjusting for the non cash gain in Q1 2016 from writing off the VISA Europe put, adjusted EPS up 23%.  Payment volume growth increased 1-2 % in most geo regions. Cross border payment growth accelerated 2% from 10-12% globally excluding VISA Europe. Including VISA Europe impact, they accelerated 10%.  Process transaction growth accelerated 15 from 12-13% driven by India and US.

Did not issue 2$ Billion in debt as panned to finance VISA Europe acquisition as well as other costs. VISA has 8$ Billion offshore, will await Trump plan for corporate tax reform which may well allow cash efficient cash repatriation. Until then, used commercial paper issuance to fund stock buyback and operating cash needs.

The only region with reduction in growth was Latin America, due to Brazil. 

The integration of VISA Europe is proceeding and will continue throughout 2017. Europe represents meaningful growth opportunities, with large opportunities to displace cash.  Plan to advance digital payments by rolling out tokenization, VISA Checkout, and supporting digital wallets.   VISA continued to focus on local market priorities alongside client engagement. The vast majority of VISA payments volume in Europe remain under contract and is therefore protected in the short term.

The deliberate process of consultation of VISA Europe staff was completed later than expected. New hiring, investment to integrate technology with that of the international VISA system are adding expenses as planned.   As cost reductions are realized and Europe clients access global VISA capabilities,  earnings will accrete and value will be realized for shareholders, as planned since the takeover was announced.  Equity dilution related to the purchase is being offset by accelerated share buybacks. 

In India, Aggressive demonetization measures pushed by the government resulted in doubled transaction volumes but little revenue growth. Responsive to request by the Indian Government, VISA charged no fees for processing through 12-31-2016.  VISA regards this as an opportunity to expand the network and acceptance internationally, focusing on building customer awareness and merchant acceptance 

Kelly articulated “So.. when you consider the economics of the investment we will make in India, plus conservative pricing, it will not drive much profit this year. But this is a great year to make sure we do everything we can in one of the two largest population countries in the world to get as good a position as we can to help us over the next decade. “

I would like to make two observations on this lovely sentence.

1. It prioritizes strengthening the company competitive advance for the long term over short  term profits

2. the nature of the VISA business supports long term investments such as the one mentioned because of its competitive advantage.  The VISA services introduced into the developing India market will still be indispensable in 10 y.  As long as VISA continues to support successful innovations in payments, while nurturing and strengthening its network security and reach, it will undoubtedly maintain its relevance and dominance in the market. 

 

 

 

Essential Criteria of an Amateur Investor investment.

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edited 4-4-2016
1.  Sustainable Competitive advantage defending or growing market share in its specific market.  This is the sine qua non of our investment choices and the foundation of our approach to investment.  The company with a competitive advantage is rare.  It is marked by the ability to increasingly attain returns on investment above its cost of capital, and above those of its competitors.  A competitive advantage might be made durable by low cost/high volume leadership among competitors; barrier to market entry of competitors; product differentiation/switching costs to customers.  The company with a sustainable competitive advantage sells an indispensable product.

2. No competitive advantage truly lasts for ever. Hence, a related critical facet of the competitive advantage feature is that management consistently anticipates or reacts to changes in the market or competitive landscape by finding profitable ways of extending the company’s competitive advantage into new markets that are tangibly related to its current markets. That is, the company adapts and evolves to perpetuate its competitive advantage by extending it into the evolving new markets.

3.  Evidence of devotion to shareholders by its capital allocation, manifested in the following ways
stock buybacks to reduce share count
avoiding excessive dilutive stock compensation
obtaining good returns on investments in acquisitions
aligning reward and performance of management and employees to reward shareholders and long term company performance
allowing shareholders to have voting power commensurate with their stock ownership.

4  Common stock of publically traded company based in U.S. or other relatively transparent legal environment with respect for property rights, at least 10 years old.

5. The investment worthy activities of the business are demonstrated in the record of its past and present achievements, not in the hoped for future.

6.  quantitative evidence of ability to obtain returns on investment above cost of capital, such as low debt level, growing free cash flow, high free cash/revenue, high gross margin, high ROE and ROI.

Microsoft: leveraging and extending its competitive advantage into the future

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September 14, 2014.

My approach to investing in individual companies starts with identifying the rare companies with a sustainable competitive advantage.  While the existence of a durable competitive advantage is manifested in quantifiable features of the financial statement, the ultimate judgment of whether the current competitive advantage will last for the foreseeable future is qualitative, relying on an understanding of the nature, competitive environment and history of the business.

To adapt to an ever changing future, vigilant companies make trial investments in new related markets. The longest lasting companies are those who finally invest only in those areas in which they can maintain a competitive advantage, and hence continue to earn better than average returns on investment for the foreseeable future.   Many companies watch their once impregnable advantage decline as events shape history’s final judgment.  For example, Kodak was dominant in photographic film and in the 1970s had a 90% market share.  It then participated in the invention of digital photography and had the opportunity to integrate its own digital photo technology into PCs in the 1980s.  But Kodak did not pro-actively build a new basis for market dominance in the new markets.  Competitors caught up and passed, Kodak faded and finally filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in 2012. It turns out that rare companies do the work to create bridges to future franchises, using their current market dominance to shape and outcompete in new markets.  Microsoft (MSFT) is such a company.

For the past 10 or 12 years, Microsoft has frankly been unloved by the fashionable tech media, and increasingly by the professional investing crowd.  Under this surface air of decayed greatness is an irrepressible, tenacious organism that adapts by thrusting into new territories, taking root only in areas in which it may extend its competitive advantage, and then proceeding to compete as if its life depended on it.

Recently, MSFT has put in motion a few approaches to increase its competitiveness, and these are now beginning to bear fruit.  These include low balling the price of its Windows OS;  developing its applications for cross platform markets;  partnering with 3rd party software/platform providers that may be competitors; and transitioning its market dominance to the cloud.

MSFT has used these strategies before. For example, in the early 1980’s Multiplan, the predecessor of Excel, was coded for a software emulator that would be interpreted for different OEM PCs. Thus it was sold to more than a hundred different OEMs selling to businesses, in an ultimately successful end run around Visicalc, which had locked up the retail market.  When MS-DOS was released in 1981, it was virtually given away to OEMs building IBM PC clones for a flat fee.  Clearly, MSFT viewed this as a race to sell applications (also including the programming languages that comprised its main business) as opposed to the OS.

For a vivid account of early Microsoft history and the tale of how a couple of intelligent, determined youngsters, who thought out of the box and had the courage to act on their convictions, created what would become one of the most formidable companies in history, read the splendid Hard Drive: Bill Gates and the Making of the Microsoft Empire
by James Wallace and Jim Erickson.

As announced in April at Build 2014 conference, Windows is now free to OEMs for smartphones and devices of screen size 9 inches or less, and windows now has lower processor and storage requirements. While Windows still has roughly 90% market share in PCs, the overall variegated market of computing devices has vastly increased in the last 10 years, so that Windows has less than 20% market share of that wider universe.  There are large markets for MSFT software.

OEMs have responded vigorously to this overture. For example, more than 11 (up from 3) signed up for Windows phone in the first quarter of this year.  It is important to note that since android OEMS must still pay license fees to MSFT, a $0 Windows Phone license costs them less than Android.

A lower cost Windows opens up markets on devices, as in the past, to Microsoft apps. These include both consumer oriented apps such as Xbox music, video and games, productivity apps including office 365, and services to manage devices for businesses. Over 2 years ago MSFT began writing a version of Office for iOS. When finally released in late March, it was  downloaded almost 30 million times in less than two months.  CEO Satya Nadella has articulated the vision of “Cloud First, Mobile First”, and that Microsoft will focus on “platforms and services”.  From the vantage point of BYOD, this means that businesses will use MSFT productivity applications on popular devices, on the respective different platforms, and manage mobile devices with MSFT Cloud based subscription services such as Microsoft Intune.

A third way MSFT is increasing competitiveness is by partnering with competing software service and platform providers. For the past 2 years, because there is demand for services from other providers in the public cloud, Windows Azure has increasingly accommodated services on 3rd party platforms running on Linux or from other providers such as Salesforce, SAP, Oracle and many, many others. This has produced a hockey stick upshift in Azure revenue growth.  See here for more on how Microsoft is levering its market dominance in productivity applications and services to gain market share in the Cloud, from which it wields the Cloud First, Mobile First strategy.